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Neoliberal Penality 1

Introduction

“The laws that govern societies are the laws of natural order
the most advantageous to humankind.”

With these words, François Quesnay opened his essay on The Despotism
of China in 1767. The essay would be one of Quesnay’s last contributions

to the field of economics—a discipline that he helped establish—and this
first sentence captured the organizing principle of his entire economic
thought: natural order. The economic domain, Quesnay believed, was
governed by a natural order and constituted an autonomous, self-regulating
system that required no external intervention. Quesnay and his followers
would become known around the world as “Physiocrats,” a neologism
meant to designate “the rule of nature.” The same year, 1767, Quesnay’s
leading disciple, Pierre Paul Le Mercier de La Rivière, would similarly open
his book, The Natural and Essential Order of Political Societies, by
declaring: “There exists a natural order for the government of men reunited
in society.”1
This conception of natural order grounded the Physiocrats’ theories
of economic production and of the wealth of nations. It was the very
foundation of their argument for free commerce and trade. The natural
order that reigned in the economic domain demanded that there be no
interference with the laws of nature. And so Quesnay would write in his
General Maxims of Political Economy, also penned in 1767, italicizing and
capitalizing his central economic theory: “Let us maintain complete liberty
of commerce; for THE POLICY IN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN
TRADE THAT IS THE SUREST, THE MOST APPROPRIATE, THE
MOST PROFITABLE TO THE NATION AND TO THE STATE
CONSISTS IN COMPLETE FREEDOM OF COMPETITION.”2
The Physiocrats’ idea of natural order would also give rise to a
political theory that Quesnay and Le Mercier would call “legal despotism.”
In their writings from 1767, Quesnay and Le Mercier argued for a unitary
executive—an absolute, hereditary monarch—who would recognize and
thereby instantiate the laws of nature without the benefit of a legislative
body. Precisely because the natural laws were perfect and most
advantageous to mankind, Quesnay and Mercier argued, there was nothing
for a legislator to do in the economic sphere. Man-made laws and
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government intervention could only disrupt the natural laws governing
economic production. Positive man-made law, then, was relegated to one
and only one area: to criminalize and severely punish those men who did
not recognize and abide by the natural order, those men who were
unregulated—“déréglés”—and disorderly, those who stole and were wicked.
The idea of natural order and the theory of legal despotism
fundamentally reshaped the relationship between, on the one hand,
commerce, trade, and economic relations, and, on the other hand,
punishment practices and theory. In the period before, the dominant view
rested on the idea that the criminal sanction was one form of governmental
intervention no different from the general administration of commerce and
trade. Punishments formed part of a larger administrative framework
intended to set prices and regulate all domains of human behavior, whether
economic, social, or penal. That earlier framework is captured best by the
famous tract of Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishment, published in
1764. In the period after, a different vision would come to dominate, and
the criminal sanction—as opposed to free trade policies—would become
viewed as an extraordinary device that enabled the state to legitimately
intervene in the penal area, there and there alone.
By means of this fundamental transformation, the criminal sanction
changed from an ordinary form of regulation no different than tariffs and
levies to an exceptional mechanism of state intervention in situations lying
beyond or outside the market model. By pushing the state outside the
market and giving it free rein there and there alone, the Physiocratic ideal of
natural order facilitated the expansion of the penal sphere. It made it easier
to resist government intervention in economics, but to penalize any
deviations from the norm. It lightened any real and potential resistance to
government initiatives in law enforcement, the criminal law, and its
execution.
The Physiocratic ideas of natural order and legal despotism would
be rehearsed in history, resurfacing in different guises, and ultimately would
shape the dominant imagination in the United States. Jeremy Bentham in
the nineteenth century would essentially reproduce this rationality by
means of a unique alchemy that blended Cesare Beccaria on crime and
punishment with Adam Smith on economic liberty. In the next century,
neoliberal economists and thinkers such as Richard Posner and Richard
Epstein would reformulate, in a more technical and updated vocabulary, the
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same idea of natural order, but this time under the rubric of “market
efficiency.” Precisely because of the natural efficiency of markets, the
government would be relegated to the realm beyond or outside the market,
to the realm of “market bypassing” or “market failure” where there and
there alone the government could legitimately intervene and punish
severely. Quesnay’s ideas of natural order and legal despotism would be
eerily reflected, in a different and updated vocabulary to be sure, in this
succinct passage by Richard Posner in an article in 1985:
The major function of criminal law in a capitalist society is to
prevent people from bypassing the system of voluntary,
compensated exchange—the “market,” explicit or implicit—in
situations where, because transaction costs are low, the market is a
more efficient method of allocating resources than forced exchange.
. . . When transaction costs are low, the market is, virtually by
definition, the most efficient method of allocating resources.
Attempts to bypass the market will therefore be discouraged by a
legal system bent on promoting efficiency.3
A new discourse, a more technical jargon, but essentially the same idea: the
economic sphere is governed by a certain orderliness that should make us
cautious regarding government interference; by contrast, the state should
have free rein in the penal sphere. There, it can and should set prices—in
the words of Bentham, a grand menu of prices for human behavior.
The Physiocrats’ idea of natural order gave birth to our modern
vision of neoliberal penality. Neoliberal penality is the form of rationality in
which the penal sphere is pushed outside political economy and serves the
function of a boundary: the penal sanction is marked off from the
dominant logic of classical economics as the only space where order is
legitimately enforced by the state. On this view, the bulk of human
interaction—which can be understood through an economic lens—is
viewed as voluntary, compensated, orderly, and tending toward the
common good; the penal sphere is the outer bound, where the government
can legitimately interfere, there and there alone.
The term “neoliberal” and its companion, “neoliberalism,” of
course, are deeply contested—like most “ism” terms—even among those
who carefully study the concepts.4 In this article, I employ the term
neoliberal because I am addressing the space of contemporary liberal
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thought that is more heavily influenced by economics, but I do so in a
slightly larger historical and theoretical sense than some of the more critical
writings on neoliberalism. The latter tend to focus more heavily on the
period following 1970—referring to the period before that as “embedded
liberalism”—and especially on the rise of Ronald Reagan and Margaret
Thatcher, on the wave of privatization that ensued, and on the
“Washington Consensus” that followed in the 1990s.5 I am trying to
capture a more historical and political theoretic notion that is more
continuous with early liberalism—that interprets neoliberal thought as a
mere recurrence or reiteration, often in more technical jargon, of ideas that
were central to early liberal economic thought.
I use the term neoliberal here to capture a set of default assumptions
in favor of less state intervention in economic markets. It is not intended to
map on perfectly to the more extreme market libertarian position associated
with the early Chicago School. It is instead a more moderate and somewhat
more popularized version—one that essentially relates back, over a longer
arc of history and political theory, to early liberal thought. It is the view that
government intervention in the economic domain tends to be inefficient
and should therefore be avoided. What characterizes this more moderate
view is a set of softer a priori assumptions. In contrast to the more radical
rhetoric of the early Chicago School, contemporary neoliberals contend
only that less regulated market mechanisms tend to work better, in part
because of lower transaction costs, but also because market participants are
better information gatherers and tend to be more invested in the ultimate
outcome; and that government agencies suffer from greater principal-agent
problems, are less nimble at adjusting to changing market conditions, and
become more entrenched and subject to interest group capture. These
familiar arguments, together, tend to promote a loose default position that
favors “free market” mechanisms over “regulation.”
There is of course, inevitably, a chronological dimension to the term
neoliberalism: it distinguishes twentieth century thinkers, such as Friedrich
Hayek, Milton Friedman, and George Stigler, from early liberal thinkers,
such as François Quesnay and Adam Smith. But it is the continuity rather
than the chronological differentiation that attracts me to the term. My
purpose in using the term is to bridge the chronological dimension. Rather
than to emphasize the radical nature and “shock” political effects of
neoliberalism, I seek to trace the core idea of market efficiency back to an
earlier idea of natural order. This is not to suggest that the differences
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between the earlier liberal writings and neoliberalism are only a matter of
vocabulary and technical jargon. There are subtle nuances—and at least two
immediately come to mind. The first is what one might call an ideological
difference. Early liberal thinkers had a set of ideas that, they argued, had not
yet been put to the test; they were, in a sense, more utopian or idealist, and
claimed to be reacting against a dominant political economy of
mercantilism, cameralism, or centralized and controlled economic
governance. Contemporary neoliberals come after a lot of experimentation
and some history, including the Great Depression, the New Deal, the wave
of privatizations, and the 2008 financial collapse. In this sense,
contemporary neoliberalism often has a more pronounced ideological
element because it tends to minimize historical instances of market failure.
The second difference has to do with conviction or faith: neoliberalism here
is understood as the belief that we actually live in a free market system in
the United States today and that this system has triumphed. It is the belief
that the early European markets of the eighteenth century were completely
and excessively regulated and that those of the United States today are free
or freer. These two dimensions of difference are important and will be
discussed at length, but should not overshadow the continuity from the idea
of natural order to the notion of market efficiency, nor the central purpose
of this article.
The key point is that the grounding assumption of neoliberal
penality and of early liberal economic thought, and, for that matter, of most
opponents of early- and neoliberal penality—namely, the core belief in the
duality of “free markets” versus “regulation”—is an illusion that is highly
misleading and detrimental to our political union. The central categories of
“natural order,” “market efficiency,” and the “free market,” as well as the
categories of “regulation” or “heavily regulated markets” or the argument
for “more regulation,” are rhetorical tropes that serve no useful analytic
purpose, but that have had a devastating effect on our penal sphere.
In this sense, this article asks the question: what work do these
categories of “natural order” and “market efficiency” do for us? What do we
achieve when we distribute mechanisms of market organization into the
two categories—the free and the constrained—and then judge them on that
basis? The answer it proposes is that we have developed these categories in
order to place what are in fact irreducibly individual phenomena (namely,
different forms of market organization) in a coherent frame and to deploy
simplistic heuristic devices to expedite our evaluation of different forms of
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economic organization—but that those heuristic devices are faulty. In the
process, we have created categories that are responsible, first, for facilitating
our growing penal sphere and, second, for naturalizing and thereby masking
the distributive consequences associated with different methods of
organizing markets.
Let me emphasize. It is not just that the categories are not useful.
They have been affirmatively detrimental. The logic of neoliberal penality
has facilitated contemporary punishment practices by encouraging the belief
that the legitimate space for government intervention is in the penal
sphere—there and there alone. The logic of neoliberalism has greased the
wheels for our carceral expansion. Naturally, since neoliberal penality is but
a form of rationality or logic, it has not caused mass incarceration in the
United States. Other more immediate political and social practices—
including the War on Drugs, racial discrimination and profiling, law-andorder politics in the 1970s, a Southern backlash to the Civil Rights
movement, the collapse of the rehabilitative model, and sentencing
enhancements, to name but a few—all contributed more proximately to the
growing number of prison inmates. But neoliberal penality facilitated these
practices by weakening the resistance to governmental initiatives in the
penal domain because that is where the state may legitimately govern.
The key to understanding our contemporary punishment practices,
then, turns on the emergence in the eighteenth century of the idea of
natural order and the eventual metamorphosis of this idea, over the course
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, into the concept of market
efficiency. It is the idea of natural order that renders coherent and makes
possible the belief in self-adjusting and self-sustaining markets—the idea of
self-stabilizing internal flows that function best when left alone. This
conceptualization of natural orderliness, of spontaneous equilibrium, of
natural harmony in the economic realm, is what allowed eighteenth century
thinkers to reimagine social reality, to separate economy and society, and to
relocate and expand the penal sphere.
This project begins, then, very far away in time and place from our
current financial crisis—in the Parisian markets of the eighteenth century,
with the establishment of the lieutenant générale de police du Châtelet de
Paris and the “police” of bakers, grain merchants, and markets. So let me
begin the story there.
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I. Parisian Markets

In early May 1739, commissioner Emmanuel Nicolas Parisot was doing his

rounds in the Marais. As the investigator, examiner, and royal counselor
responsible for the Saint-Antoine district, Parisot reported to René Hérault,
lieutenant général de police at the Châtelet of Paris, the royal palace of
justice. Parisot was at the Saint-Paul market going from baker to baker,
weighing their bread, when he discovered at Jean Thyou’s stand “four
three-pound breads each light one-and-a-half ounces.”6 At about the same
time, commissioner Charles, also doing his rounds, discovered at Courtois’
bakery on rue de Chantre “one bread labeled eight pounds in weight, light
two ounces, two others marked the same weight one ounce light each, six
labeled four pounds in weight each one ounce off, another six pound bread
light one ounce and a half, two others labeled six pounds in weight, eight
others marked four pounds in weight, all a half ounce light.”7 Another
commissioner, Delespinay, found a cache of underweight breads in a small
room hidden in the back of Aublay’s bakery shop on the vieille rue du
Temple. Delespinay immediately seized the bread and had it sent to the
8
Sisters of the Charity of the Saint-Gervais parish. (Commissioner Charles
had sent his confiscated bread to the Capuchin friars on the rue Saint
Honoré and to the poor at the parish of Saint-Germain l’Auxerrois.)9 When
the lieutenant de police held court the following May 5th, 1739, Hérault
condemned the bakers but showed mercy and “this time only” sentenced
each to only fifty livres in fines.10
Later the same month, the 29th of May, master baker Amand, an
elected syndic in charge of his community of master bakers, found himself
accused of selling a loaf of bread in his shop—specifically, “one white bread
weighing four pounds, at eleven sols”—at a higher price than market—to
be exact, “three deniers for each pound above the common market price.”11
Hérault declared Amand guilty, fined him three hundred livres, and
stripped him of his elected office. In the sentencing order, Hérault ordered
the other syndics to assemble within three days of the publication of his
sentence and to proceed in their office to the election of a new syndic. 12 A
week earlier, Hérault had convicted Marie-Hebert Heguin of buying grain
at market for resale and fined her 1,000 livres.13 A royal ordinance
prohibited buying grain with the intention of reselling it: “It is permitted to
purchase grain at market for one’s use; however, it is not permitted to buy
grain for resale: the reason, very simply, is that he who buys for purposes of
resale must necessarily gain from the transaction and, as a result, will sell it
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at a higher price than market rate, which constitutes a punishable
monopoly.”14
It is in these terms that Me. Edme de la Poix de Freminville
described the Parisian grain markets in his Dictionnaire ou traité de la
police générale published in 1758, in which he collected, assembled,
organized, classified, reported and reprinted a myriad of these sentences and
royal ordinances. A manual of policing, a compendium of disciplinary
practices, Freminville’s dictionary codified alphabetically a gamut of rules
and prescriptions covering not only subsistence—grains, bread, meats, fish,
poultry, oysters, and legumes—but also gaming, sanitation, religious
practice, guilds, sexual mores, even the charivaria. The dictionary contained
564 pages of the most minute regulation of, well, practically everything.
Freminville was intimately familiar with these ordinances. Himself a

bailli for the village and surroundings of Lapalisse in the Auvergne region of

central France, Freminville had similar magisterial powers in his countryside
as a lieutenant général de police would have had in Paris. Freminville
published his dictionary more than fifty years after the first volume of
Delamare’s famous Traité de Police had appeared in 1705—the first of four
massive in-folio tomes documenting and tracing in intricate detail the
history of the police of Paris. Freminville, though, targeted a wider audience
with his dictionary. Whereas Delamare had written for the urban police
officer—especially the Parisian police administrator—Freminville pitched
his treatise to the far more numerous country magistrates and prosecutors—
the many procureurs fiscaux, who resided in each village in France and
administered the police function, meting out justice and regulating all
aspects of daily life. By alphabetizing the rules and making them available in
a more concise, single volume, in-quarto, Freminville sought to disseminate
the disciplinary rules further, to publicize them, to make them known—in
their finest detail.
“Transgression of laws and ordinances are crimes both large and
small, but however slight they may be, the ministry of the procureur fiscal
must not tolerate them,” Freminville observed. “To despise but ignore small
mistakes is to allow larger ones, and impunity throws villains into new
infidelities.”15 Quoting Saint-Bernard, from Book 3 of de Consideratione,
Freminville declared that impunity is the “daughter of negligence, mother
of insolence, source of impudence, nurse of iniquity and of transgressions of
law.”16 He concluded: “The officer whose role is to suppress anything that
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deviates from what is prescribed as orderly must not neglect, even with
respect to minor things, to punish those who contravene.”17
Oddly, Freminville himself was deeply skeptical of these ordinances
and opposed the restrictions on commerce associated with the regulation of
the grain and bread markets. Freminville was a partisan of free trade, he
professed. “It is indeed a delicate matter to tinker with the price of grain
and its commerce, because he who regulates with an eye to reducing the
market price often discovers that, as a result of unforeseen circumstances,
the very regulations that he crafted, far from reducing it, raise the price and
reduce the supply of the goods in question.”18 Freminville was a free trader
and believed that self-interest would serve to ensure an abundant supply of
wheat and barley. This, he thought, was self-evident and demonstrated
practically every day: whereas, for instance, the grain reserves maintained by
the state and provinces had to be thrown in the river, rotten and infested,
private individuals preserved their stock well in their granaries. “Such waste
would never happen with an individual,” Freminville observed, “because it
is their own property.”19 Private property and personal interest would help
forestall such sordid outcomes and prevent the recurring grain shortages—
les disettes, as they were called—that plagued France.
Despite his free trade ideology, or perhaps because of it, Freminville
dissected and catalogued, reported, cried—much like the sentences
themselves were cried at market—and decried the intricate details of myriad
rules and regulations. Of Freminville’s lengthy book, ninety pages concern
the cultivation and commerce of grain, the sale of bread, the regulation of
the boulangers, meuniers, etc. That represents a full sixth of the entire
dictionary. And it covered everything from prohibiting the purchase of
grain on the stalk to prohibiting anyone from walking in fields that have
been sown (especially to pick flowers); from fixing the hours of sale to fixing
the dates for harvesting; from prohibiting speech that would tend to raise
grain prices to requiring seminaries and colleges to warehouse three years
worth of grain at all times.
All sales, naturally, were to take place at market. “It is forbidden,
first, to sell or buy grains outside the market. The age-old prohibitions on
this question, which dated back to the fourteenth century, had never been
repealed, and since 1709 had been taken up again and applied more or less
strictly.”20 To ensure that all sales were conducted at market, other
regulations imposed an obligation to certify market sales. A sentence issued
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in the police tribunal of the old Châtelet, dated October 10, 1681, confirms
the confiscation of a “muid (measure) of flour in fifteen bags” for not
having obtained a “certificate from where such merchandise was bought,”
and for failing to turn over the goods “to the measurers upon arrival at the
doors and barriers” of the city.21
Once at the market, producers were forbidden to sell their grain and
flour before a specified hour—an hour that varied according to the season.
The eighteenth-century regulations followed daylight savings time.22 There
were also rules about who could buy first at market. “Typically, the opening
[of the market] was reserved for private individuals,” Afanassiev writes,
“that is to say, those who were neither bakers nor traders. Members of this
latter group were not admitted until later. In Paris, they did not have the
right to come to the market or be represented there before noon, nor could
they even talk with vendors near the perimeter of the market.”23 Other
ordinances punished speech that could tend to increase the price of grain.
According to Freminville, the grain trade had to be one of the main
concerns of the county prosecutor. Freminville repeatedly underscored the
importance of the market regulations: grain and grain markets, he affirmed,
“should constitute the largest and principal responsibility of the Procurer
Fiscal.”24 “We are dealing here with the lives of our fellow humans, and it is
imperative that they not be sacrificed to the monopolists who meddle in
selling and reselling grain.”25 Freminville’s dictionary covered the grain
industry exhaustively, and there were in fact so many regulations of the
market that, for the dictionary entry on “Marchés”—the entry on
markets—Freminville merely refers the reader, by cross reference, to
another entry.26 His dictionary reads:
MARKETS. SEE POLICE.
To our modern eyes, the Parisian police des grains—that intricate
and extensive web of royal decrees and ordinances that governed every
minute aspect of the commerce of grain under the ancien régime and that
gave rise to what has been called “the grain wars of the eighteenth
century”—has come to symbolize excessive government control and
intervention. The policing of the grain trade—that tangled lattice of edicts
and decrees intended to keep down the price of bread in Paris and the
provinces—stands today as a labyrinth, a maze, a morass of regulations, of
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minute government tinkering in the most atomic details of the commercial
exchange.
Codes, dictionaries, and treatises of the police would proliferate in
the mid-eighteenth century to catalogue and disseminate these ordinances.
The 1750s and 60s were an important period—not, naturally, for the
codification of rules themselves. That had been recurring since at least the
sixteenth century and the important dates were well known: the réglements
of 1567 and 1577, the déclaration of August 31, 1699 or April 19, 1723.
No, the mid-eighteenth century was an important period for the
dissemination of the rules, for the cataloguing, for publicizing the
regulations. 1758 marked not only the publication of Freminville’s
Dictionnaire, but also of Duchesne’s augmented and authoritative second
edition of Code de la police, ou analyse des réglemens de police, divisé en
douze titres. Originally published in Paris the year before, Duchesne’s
popular treatise would already be supplemented and reprinted a year later
and it compiled, in over 480 pages, all the police rules and regulations that
extended over the areas of religion, customs, health, science and liberal arts,
commerce, manufacture, mechanical arts, servants, domestics, and the poor.
1758 also marked the publication of the first volumes of the Code Louis

XV: Recueil des principaux Edits, déclarations, Ordonnances, Arrêts,
Sentences et réglemens concernant la justice, police et finances depuis 1722
jusqu’en 1740. The Recueil would assemble all the important ordinances
and sentences on policing and grow to a twelve volume set, in-12.27
Numerous other codes, including Deslandes’ 1767 Code de la police ou
analyse des réglemens de police, divisé en douze titres, would be published
and reprinted in Paris during the period.

It was precisely this maze of ordinances that Adam Smith, in The
Wealth of Nations, castigated as “such absurd regulations, as frequently
aggravate the unavoidable misfortune of a dearth, into the dreadful calamity
of a famine”28 or as “the folly of human laws.”29 It was an economic
approach, Smith would famously suggest, that “embraced all the prejudices
of the mercantile system, in its nature and essence a system of restraint and
regulation.”30 And still today, most commentators characterize the period as
excessively regulated, over-regulated, a frenzy of market intervention—the
minute regulation of the smallest infraction. Order-maintenance at the
most micro level.
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II. Our Modern Free Markets

The

contrast could not be greater with the general perception of
contemporary markets—whether in grain or more broadly. Today, most of
us tend to view modern markets and commodity exchanges as relatively
free. Commerce has been liberalized, the forces of free market exchange
have been unleashed, and the constraints of the past lifted. Self-adjusting
market mechanisms have replaced the police des grains and, in a far more
efficient manner, ensure reasonable prices and abundant supply. Though
globalization and population growth loom on the horizon as a potential
threat to the adequate supply of commodities, voluntary and free market
exchange at home is the model of choice.
“[T]he close of the twentieth century saw a virtual canonization of
market organization as the best, indeed the only effective, way to structure
an economic system,” observes professor Richard Nelson at Columbia
University.31 As J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer add,
“Throughout Eastern and Western Europe as well as in North America
during the 1980s, there was a dramatic shift toward a popular belief in the
efficacy of self-adjusting market mechanisms. Indeed, the apparent failure
of Keynesian economic policies, the strains faced by the Swedish social
democratic model, and the collapse of Eastern bloc economies led many
journalistic observers to argue that capitalism is a system of free markets
that has finally triumphed.”32 Nelson captures the dominant, orthodox
view succinctly:
For-profit firms are the vehicles of production. They decide
what to produce and how, on the basis of their assessments
about what is most profitable…. Competition among firms
assures that production is efficient and tailored to what users
want, and prices are kept in line with costs. The role of
government is limited to establishing and maintaining a
body of law to set the rules for the market game and
assuring the availability of basic infrastructure needed for
the economy to operate.33
Nelson concedes that this is a simplified version of “the standard textbook
model in economics,”34 perhaps even a bit “folk theory.”35 But it is, in broad
outline, an accurate description of a dominant view that has had a powerful
influence on the latter part of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

12
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As Boyer suggests, accurately I believe, “The market is now considered by a
majority of managers and politicians as the coordinating mechanism ‘par
excellence.’”36
The financial crisis of 2008 shook these beliefs, but did not
displaced them. There is for instance, in the United States today, a
remarkable and persistent resistance to nationalization of banks and automakers, and a continued faith in the abilities of the market. This was
evident from the debate over the nationalization of banks tinkering on
bankruptcy in the Spring of 2009. It was not possible then to talk about
nationalization without mentioning its temporary nature. In fact, the
preferred term for temporary nationalization became “preprivatization”—
the idea that we had to nationalize financial institutions in order to better
privatize them after a few months.37 The contrast to the penal sphere could
not be sharper. Never in a million years would anyone talk about
“preprivatizing” corrections or prisons or punishment. The resistance to this
way of speaking in the punishment sphere and the contrast to the economic
domain remain so profound.
The standard view of market superiority in the economic domain
traces, generally, to the Chicago School of economics and its founders,
Milton Friedman and George Stigler. The central tenets of the Chicago
School are usefully summarized by David Leonhardt in the following terms:
“The Chicago School believes that markets—that is, millions of individuals
making separate decisions—almost always function better than economies
that are managed by governments. In a market system, prices adjust
whenever there is a shortage or a glut, and the problem soon resolves itself.
Just as important, companies constantly compete with each other, which
helps bring down prices, improves the quality of goods and ultimately lifts
living standards.”38
To be sure, many commentators today, especially law scholars and
lawyers who toil in the regulatory domain, consider this “free market
libertarian” version of the Chicago School a bit of an extreme position. And
even some of the staunchest Chicago School adherents have themselves
softened their claims to allow for slightly more governmental intervention
in cases of market failure due to collective action, monopolistic, or other
coordination problems. Nevertheless, the more extreme market libertarian
position has helped shape a more moderate view that is dominant today: the
view that government intervention in the economic domain tends to be
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inefficient and should therefore be avoided. This view is characterized by a
set of gentler a priori assumptions: market mechanisms tend to work better,
government agencies and interventions tend to be less efficient. These
assumptions reflect a more popular and current notion of political economy
that essentially provides, as David Harvey suggests, that “The role of the
state is to create and preserve an institutional framework [characterized by
strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade]…. State
interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum
because, according to the theory,” Harvey elaborates, “the state cannot
possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signals (prices)
and because powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state
interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit.”39 These
are familiar arguments and, together, they tend to promote a loose default
position that favors market mechanisms over “regulation”—a tilt in favor of
markets. They form precisely what I would call “neoliberalism.”

The evidence is clear, at least in public opinion polls. In a Financial
Times/Harris Poll opinion poll conducted September 6 and 17, 2007, 49%
of respondents in the United States answered affirmatively—in contrast to
17% who responded negatively—to the question “Do you think a freemarket, capitalist economy (an economic system in which prices and wages
are determined by unrestricted competition between businesses, with
limited government regulation or fear of monopolies) is the best economic
system or not?”40 In another poll, a twenty-nation poll conducted by the
Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of
Maryland, researchers found that an average 71% of respondents in the
United States agree with the statement that “The free enterprise system and
free market economy is the best system on which to base the future of the
world;” only 24% of respondents disagreed with that statement.41 Although
these polls were taken before the financial collapse of 2008 and the numbers
themselves may also be in a recession, it is likely that they too will recover
along with any expected future economic recovery.
This dominant view is reinforced daily in the leading newspapers, in
the media and through the voice of our national leaders both on the right
and on the left—often in the most unexpected places.42 Contemporary selfadjusting market mechanisms have become the norm, and we are no longer
at the mercy of the minute disciplinary regimentation characterized by the
Parisian police des grains of the mid-eighteenth century. At least, that’s
what many like to tell themselves.
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III. Chicago Board of Trade, circa 2000

In the wheat pits at the Chicago Board of Trade, 12:01 P.M., March 20,
1996, following a period of tight supplies in the wheat market. Loud
buzzers and Board staff visually signaled the close of the market for the
March 1996 wheat futures. The closing period—which spanned from
12:00 P.M. to 12:01 P.M. on March 20th—had just expired. There were
sixty-one buy order contracts that were still unfilled at the end of the
closing period, and the last contracts had traded at $5.30 to $5.35 a bushel,
in line with the morning’s trades. Two traders who held market-on-close
orders, George F. Frey and John C. Bedore, bid up the price through
closing to approximately $6.00 per bushel, but they were met with no
responses from other members of the pit.
At 12:02 P.M., one minute past the close, J. Brian Schaer, a local in
the pit, offered to sell contracts at $7.00, and approximately twelve seconds
later, at 12:02:12 P.M., sold thirty-one contracts at that price to Frey and
Bedore—who had been bidding up the price hoping to close their open
orders. Donald W. Scheck, another local, then offered contracts at $7.50,
with Brian Schaer matching that offer. In the next half a minute, Scheck
sold fourteen contracts to a broker Jay P. Ieronimo and Schaer sold another
sixteen contracts to Frey and Ieronimo, with the final trades taking place at
12:02:50 P.M.—one minute and fifty seconds past closing.
Rule 1007.00 of the Chicago Board of Trade provides that the pit
committee—in this case, the “Wheat Pit Committee” chaired by Jay
Ieronimo, who had just traded post-closing—could authorize an extension
of one minute only of the closing period in the case of an extraordinary
expiration. That never happened,43 but even if it had, it would only have
extended the trading period to 12:02 P.M., which would not have covered
the trades contracted after that. A number of Board officials, including
Chicago Board of Trade chairman, Patrick Arbor, and the Exchange Pit
Reporter Floor Supervisor, Patrick Sgaraglino, gathered to discuss whether
any trades after 12:02 P.M. should be honored and cleared through the
house. They decided the trades would stand because of “special
circumstances” surrounding the March wheat futures.
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Ieronimo, in his capacity as chair of the Wheat Pit Committee, then
began asking around to find out if any of the traders were interested in
holding a modified closing call—known in the trade as an “MCC” and
consisting of “a two-minute post-close trading session which may occur
after the end of a trading session and allows market users to close out
unliquidated positions. Pit committees schedule MCC sessions only when
there is an expression of interest. The MCC settlement price, which serves
as the basis for the trading range during the MCC session, is selected by the
pit committee.”44 Brian Schaer, who had sold contracts past 12:02 P.M.,
was apparently the only trader who expressed interest in an MCC.
Ieronimo decided to hold the MCC. “A bull horn was used to
announce that an MCC would be held from 12:14 P.M. to 12:16 P.M. A
few seconds before the start of the MCC, an Exchange official announced
that the MCC price range would be $5.30 to $5.32 per bushel.”45 Ray
Czupek, the floor manager and broker for Louis Dreyfus Corporation—
which still held a significant long position in March wheat—offered
contracts at $5.32 per bushel—thus entering the market for new business in
violation of the Board rule against entering new orders during an MCC.
Brian Shaer and Donald Scheck, who had both sold contracts ranging
between $7.00 and $7.50 after the one-minute extension to closing, were
the only ones to bite. Schaer and Scheck both bought contracts sufficient to
offset the entire positions that they had just created post-closing, and made
profits on their trades of, respectively, $434,800 and $152,600. There were
no other trades made during the MCC. Others involved in the earlier
trading saw large losses, some as high as $300,000.
The Office of Investigations and Audits of the Chicago Board of
Trade conducted a quick review of the March futures expiration, and about
a month later the Business Conduct Committee of the Board issued charges
against Schaer, Scheck, Ieronimo, Frey, Bedore, and Czupek, as well as
Dreyfus and two other firms. They were charged with violations of Chicago
Board Rules 1007.00, 350.05(h), 1007.02, and 425.02, proscribing afterhours trading, MCC conventions, and hedging rules. Board Rules 1007.00
and 1007.02, for instance, set forth the following restrictions on trading:
On the last day of trading in an expiring future, a bell shall be
rung at 12 o’clock noon designating the beginning of the close
of the expiring future. Trading shall be permitted thereafter for
a period not to exceed one minute and quotations made
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during this time period shall constitute the close. When in the
opinion of the relevant Pit Committee extraordinary
conditions prevail any such one minute period may be
extended to two minutes by special authorization of the
relevant Pit Committee…
Immediately following the prescribed closing procedure for all
contracts, there shall be a two (2) minute trading period (the
“modified closing call”). All trades which may occur during
regularly prescribed trading hours may occur during the call at
prices within the lesser of the actual closing range or a range of
three (3) official trading increments, i.e., one (1) increment
above and below the settlement price, or at prices within the
lesser of the actual closing range or a range of nine (9) official
trading increments, i.e., four (4) increments above and below
the settlement price, as the Regulatory Compliance Committee
shall prescribe; (ii) no new orders may be entered into the call;
(iii) cancellations may be entered into the call; (iv) stop, limit
and other resting orders elected by prices during the close may
be executed during the call; and (v) individual members may
trade as a principal and/or agent during the call. In accordance
with the determination of the Regulatory Compliance
Committee, CBOT contracts shall be traded during the
Modified Closing Call as follows: Lesser of actual closing range
or nine trading increments [for] Wheat Futures and Options.46
During the summer of 1996, the Board entered into settlement
negotiations with Schaer, Scheck, and the other individuals and firms, and
resolved the charges by way primarily of written reprimand. Settlements
were reached with Schaer, Scheck, Ieronimo, Frey and Bedore by issuing
letters of reprimand against each of them, and with Dreyfus Corporation by
means of an admission of wrongdoing and a $10,000 fine.
The Divisions of Enforcement and Trading & Markets of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, however, recommended that
the Commission review the six settlements because they did not believe that
the written sanctions were “commensurate with the gravity of the alleged
violation and otherwise failed to conform to Commission guidance on
sanctions.”47 In light of the Commission’s decision to review, the Chicago
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Board of Trade conducted additional investigations and interviewed 38
persons, had the interviews transcribed and then reviewed by the staff of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which oversees the Board; the
Board prepared follow-up questions for 19 persons at the request of the
Commission staff, and resubmitted the second round of interviews to the
Commission. The Board also submitted documentary evidence of trading
cards, order tickets, and other reports.
The Commission conducted additional investigation of its own,
reviewing—in addition to the Board documents, the record of the
disciplinary proceedings, and written argument by the parties—
“observations of Commission floor surveillance staff during the expiration”
and “information independently obtained by the Commission staff.”48 The
latter included “interviews with commercial participants, market analyses,
trading profiles of the two locals [Shaer and Scheck] involved in the
expiration, a trade practice investigation, review of data to determine
compliance with speculative position limits, and a review of the ‘gap’
function in the CBOT’s price reporting system.”49
The Commission set aside the sanctions and remanded the cases
back to the Board of Trade because the penalties had not been severe
enough. “In order to protect the integrity of the markets, the exchanges
must vigorously enforce their rules concerning trading hours and impose
meaningful sanctions in disciplinary proceedings alleging trading after the
close,” three Commissioners declared. “We believe that imposing
reprimands for misconduct as serious as that alleged here, even in the
context of settled proceedings, reflects an apparent unwillingness on the
part of the CBOT to enforce its rules in the manner necessary to ensure an
effective self-regulatory disciplinary program.”50
The United States Attorney’s Office in Chicago began investigating
trading-hour infractions on the Chicago Board of Trade. In order to
preempt further federal intervention, the Board revised its rules regarding
the possible extension of the closing period. “Most notably, the CBOT
deleted the provision under which the close of an expiring contract could be
extended from one minute to two minutes, thus eliminating potential
confusion among floor members about the appropriate duration for a close
in an expiring contract. The CBOT also now precludes the pit reporters
from accepting price quotations more than 30 seconds after the close for
futures in order to assure that trading is halted on time.”51
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IV. Framing the Question

More

than two centuries separate the police des grains and these
enforcement proceedings at the Chicago Board of Trade. The two periods
bear important similarities and differences. Yet our perception of the two
could not be more radically divergent. The Paris markets of the mideighteenth century represent to us today the epitome of excess regulation—
of government intervention gone awry, of authoritarian control of the
economy. In contrast, the Chicago Board of Trade reflects, to our modern
eyes, the epitome of the free market in the western world, the pinnacle of
free trade, the zenith of late-modern capitalism. Simply put, the Chicago
Board of Trade is the free market. When we look at the Chicago Board or
the New York Stock Exchange, we do not see the intricate web of
regulations regarding closing periods and trading hours, access, surveillance,
and computer monitoring. We do not see Chicago Board Rules 1007.00,
350.05(h), 1007.02, and 425.02, proscribing after-hours trading, MCC
conventions, and hedging rules. We see the free market at work. How did
that come about?
At both times, the market was the exclusive venue in which to
exchange the desired commodities and the markets were highly
administered. Who, when, where, how—the hours of opening and closing,
the identity of the merchants, traders, and buyers, the means of delivery,
controls on variations in pricing—all aspects of trading on the markets were
regulated. Our contemporary markets—whether the Chicago Board of
Trade, the New York Mercantile Exchange, the New York Stock Exchange,
or any of the other exchanges—are shot through with layers of overlapping
governmental supervision, of exchange rules and regulations, of federal and
state criminal investigations, and of exchange self-policing and selfregulatory mechanisms—as evident in the case of Schaer and Scheck. Our
contemporary markets, like the Parisian markets of the eighteenth century,
are policed.
Naturally, there are also marked differences. No police prefect or
procureur fiscal sets the right price of a loaf of bread or a stack of wheat
today—the prix commun du marché—although the commission for
trading the goods may be fixed and, of course, the most important
commodity of all—money—is set by the central bank both in the United
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States and in the European Union. No huissard patrols the exchange floor
conducting inspections and ferreting out fraud or deception today—
although computer algorithms, federal investigators, and the exchanges
themselves monitor each and every trade to detect suspicious activity, often
on “a customer-by-customer basis.”52 Contemporary enforcement
proceedings are more likely to involve self-regulatory mechanisms—selfmonitoring by the exchange itself, a chartered corporation not formally part
of the state—though the earlier markets were also heavily self-policed under
a guild system that functioned by means of elected syndics who policed and
monitored the commercial activities of guild members.
There are indeed important similarities and significant differences.
As a practical matter, it would be extraordinarily difficult, if not infeasible
to determine with exactitude whether the differences—with all their related
technological transformations and metamorphoses—outweigh the
similarities. It is impossible to quantify the uniform and gaze of the huissard
and measure it against the electronic impulse that reads every single stock
trade on a high volume alert. It is impracticable to weigh the impact of
prohibiting la vente par échantillons—the sale by samples—against the
effect of shutting down a thriving secondary market in mutual fund shares.
“Royal ordinances first specified a ‘circle of prohibition’ around Paris
having a radius of eight lieues (leagues). Inside this circle, any purchase of
grain by bakers or traders, whether at market or in the growers’ storehouse,
was forbidden”53: how do we measure the effect of this ordonnance and
weigh it against the fixed delivery locations and the limited space for
warehousing wheat in Chicago? How do we weigh the requirement that all
grain be sold at the Paris markets against the contemporary requirement
that all grain futures be traded at the Chicago Board of Trade?
These questions have no answer, and yet we continue to perceive
the two periods as radically different. How did it come about, exactly, that
we would perceive the first economic regime—the Paris markets circa
1750—as governed by, to borrow Adam Smith’s words, “such absurd
regulations” and yet view the second regime, the Chicago Board of Trade of
today, as “free”? What has shaped our perception so, that we would label
one “regulated” and the other “free”? How did that come about? And at
what price?
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V. The Birth of Natural Order

First, how did we come to see the Parisian police des grains as the epitome
of disciplinary regulation and the Chicago Board of Trade as the bastion of
freedom? The answer, I believe, turns on the emergence in the eighteenth
century of the idea of natural order—the notion of an economic system that
is autonomous and achieves equilibrium without government
intervention—and the eventual metamorphosis of this idea, over the course
of the twentieth century, into the concept of market efficiency. It is the idea
of natural order that renders coherent and makes possible the belief in selfadjusting and self-sustaining markets. The idea of self-stabilizing internal
flows that function best when left alone—this conceptualization of natural
orderliness, of spontaneous equilibrium, of natural harmony in the
economic realm, is what allowed eighteenth century thinkers to reimagine
social reality, and it is what facilitates the understanding we have today. The
idea of natural order also made possible the shift in semiotic meaning of the
police des grains—from a policy viewed as necessary and freedomenhancing to a policy viewed as oppressive and misguided. In addition, it
also helped displace an earlier belief that all men naturally tend toward
criminal deviance, one that remains strong today only in the penal domain.
The emergence and triumph of the idea of natural order was
influenced by François Quesnay, the Marquis de Mirabeau, Dupont de
Nemours, Le Mercier de la Rivière and other early French economists
during the period 1756 to 1767. François Quesnay, a highly accomplished
physician at Versailles, the first doctor to Mme. De Pompadour and first
ordinary to Louis XV, and a prolific writer in the medical field, turned his
attention to economics in 1756 and founded an intellectual circle that
became known as “les économistes” or “les Physiocrates.” Quesnay and his
disciples promoted the idea of an “ordre naturel” in the field of political
economy. Their writings were highly influential both in France and abroad,
and it is precisely their notion of natural order that metamorphosed, over
time, into the modern economic notion of market efficiency that is at the
heart of neoliberal thought. The Physiocrats’ idea of an “ordre naturel”
helped make it possible for us today to believe that the Parisian markets
were overregulated and that our contemporary markets are free. It is this
notion that has shaped the way we see the world.
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Of Public Economy and Police
But it was not always so. Although today we tend to characterize the
regulation of Parisian markets as excessively disciplinary and repressive,
there was an earlier time when these same regulations formed part of a more
coherent understanding that fell under an earlier rubric of “police” and that
formed an integral part of the field of public economy. One central task of
public economy, in the eyes of its earliest exponents, was precisely to ensure
the abundance and cheapness of food and consumable goods at market—
what was called, at the time, providing for “bon marché.”
The younger Adam Smith understood this well and in fact used the
discourse of bon marché in his lectures on moral philosophy and
jurisprudence in the early 1760s. It was precisely under the rubric of
“police” that Smith lectured on public economy, on the regulation of
markets, on monopolies, money, and trade: on how best to regulate
agricultural production and manufacturing; on how to encourage the
division of labor; on what to do with foreign trade; on how to manage
currency, banking and interest rates—in sum, on how to render the state
more opulent, on how to increase the wealth of a nation, or, which was the
same thing for Smith, on how to enable citizens to obtain needed and
desired food, clothes, and lodging—to satisfy the necessities of life. Smith
placed his entire discussion of public economy under the rubric of “police”
and he identified the principal task of “police” as facilitating bon marché.
In his Lectures on Jurisprudence, which he delivered at Glasgow
University during the period 1762 to 1764—after the publication of The
Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1759 but before the Wealth of Nations in
1776—the young Adam Smith used—and used exclusively—the rubric of
“police” to discuss public economy. Once the internal security of a nation
was ensured and subjects could benefit from their private property, Smith
reportedly lectured in 1762-63, the state’s attention should turn to the task
of promoting the state’s wealth. “This produces what we call police,” Smith
said. “Whatever regulations are made with respect to the trade, commerce,
agriculture, manufactures of the country are considered as belonging to the
police.”54
The young Smith traced the notion of police to French
administration, citing the folklore that the king of France demanded three
services from his lieutenant général de police—namely, that he assure the
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cleanliness and security of the nation and the abundance and cheapness of
goods at market. Smith referred specifically to the famous lieutenant de
police, Marc René de Voyer de Paulmy, marquis d’Argenson, chief of police
in Paris from 1697 to 1718, and to the story that, upon acceding to the
post, d’Argenson was told that the king of France expected him to take care
of three things: “1st, the clean<n>ess or neteté; 2nd, the aisance, ease or
security; and 3rd, bon marché or cheapness of provisions.”55 Smith lectured
56
that the goal of police is “the means proper to produce opulence,” and that
“the objects of Police are the cheapness of commodities, public security, and
cleanliness.” 57 Under the heading of police, Smith stated in his 1763-64
lectures, “we will consider the opulence of a state,”58 or, more specifically,
“the consideration of cheapness or plenty, or, which is the same thing, the
most proper way of procuring wealth and abundance.”59
To the early public economists, including the young Smith,
“police” was what ensured the abundant provision of necessary foods and
commodities. As Michel Foucault, Pasquale Pasquino, Mariana Valverde,
and others have shown, this early notion of “police” conveyed a number of
meanings—not just the enforcement function associated with the lieutenant
général de la police that, at least in some respects, resembles more closely
our contemporary understanding of law enforcement, blue uniforms, and
order maintenance.60 The term “police” also captured, in broader terms,
what we could call today “administration,” but administration limited to
the subdivisions of the state; the term gouvernement or governing, in
contrast, covered the administration of l’Etat or the state. But the different
meanings were imbricated: the administration of subsistence and markets
fell under the jurisdiction of policing functions and were perceived as
calling for surveillance. As the early Smith lectures demonstrate, public
economy and “police” were continuous.
Among the champions of the police des grains—for instance,
commissioner Nicolas Delamare, author of the Traité de la police—the
policing of markets reduced the price of bread and ensured bon marché.
Delamare had seen famine and food shortages close up, he explained. A
hands-off approach was the ideal, he suggested, but some oversight and
administration was necessary especially in times of scarcity. True liberty
required government organization. In order to achieve cheapness and
plenty—the central goal of public economy—it was necessary to calibrate
the market. On this earlier view, policing and economic welfare were one.
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It would take but a small step to extend this logic directly to the
field of crime and punishment. The young Milanese aristocrat, Cesare
Beccaria, would do just this in his concise yet seminal tract, Dei delitti e
delle pene (On Crimes and Punishments)—published anonymously in
1764. The new field of public economy, Beccaria boasted, had tamed and
civilized nations through commerce. “We have discovered the true relations
between sovereign and subjects,” Beccaria declared, “and there is waged
among nations a silent war by trade, which is the most humane sort of war
and more worthy of reasonable men.”61 The same lessons, Beccaria believed,
could tame and civilize our punishment practices, and, in the process,
eliminate the brutal excesses of seventeenth century penality. Under
Beccaria’s influence, the field of public economy would colonize the penal
domain and impose the same logic of measured and proportional responses
to the same problem of man’s natural tendency toward deviance. In
Beccaria’s eyes, men behave the same way in economic and in social
exchange: they privilege their own self-interest and always tend to break the
rules. In the penal sphere—just as in the economic domain—the solution
Beccaria proposed was to properly administer a rational framework of tariffs
and prices. For Beccaria, “police” was an integral part of public economy.
As a result, Beccaria’s lectures in public economy delivered in Milan in
1769—the notes of which were published posthumously—covered five
areas: agriculture, arts and manufacturing, commerce, finance, and police.
“Of Police” constituted an integral part of the study of public economy—
an entire section alongside commerce and finance—because it shared the
same rationality, namely that of public administration.
The common thread in the young Adam Smith and in Beccaria is
the continuity between “police” administration and economics. For both,
the two spheres were completely overlapping. To Smith, the umbrella
category is “police,” and that category subsumes the discussion of public
economy and the wealth of a nation. To Beccaria—and other cameralists of
his time—the overarching category is public economy, within which
“police” forms one important sector alongside commerce and finance. In
both, though, the two domains are seamless and continuous. The two fields
overlap and overlay. There is no alterity between them.

Of Physiocrats, Natural Order, and Market Efficiency
It is precisely this vision of a seamless relation between the field of public
economy and the realm of “police” that gives way in the second half of the
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eighteenth century to a far different ideal. If cheapness and plenty, if bon
marché was the goal of public economy and of the police des grains at midcentury, things could hardly have been more different only a decade later.
The contrast is striking and captured by the new dogma of François
Quesnay:

Abondance et non-valeur n’est pas richesse.
Disette et cherté est misère.
Abondance et cherté est opulence.62
In other words, abundance and plenty do not translate into the wealth of a
nation. Scarcity and high prices, of course, are misery. It is abundance and
high prices that produces opulence.
This shift would radically transform the meaning, the connotation,
and the role of policing—and it would do so first in the writings of the
earliest économistes. From François Quesnay’s first published contribution
to the field of political economy, his encyclopedia entry on Fermiers
(Farmers) in Tome VI of the Encyclopédie in 1756, to his final
contributions to economics collected and published in Du Pont de
Nemours’ Physiocratie in 1768, Quesnay would fundamentally reorient the
relationship between public economy and “police”: governmental
intervention in the markets would become oppressive and interfere with the
autonomous functioning of an economic system governed by natural laws
and natural order. By 1776, the year The Wealth of Nations was published,
Adam Smith would no longer use the rubric “police” to discuss public
economy. In fact, the word “police” appears rarely in the text of The
Wealth of Nations.
A new way of thinking had taken hold, one based on the idea of

natural order. Natural order reigned in the economic domain—in

agriculture and commerce—and thereby obviated the need for “police.”
The sphere of public economy came to be viewed as an autonomous, selfadjusting system regulated by natural laws that, if left alone, produced a net
product. The only way for the state to participate in the wealth of the
nation was not to administer and police, but instead to pull out of the
sphere of agricultural production and stop intervening in commerce and
trade. The police function was severed from the economic domain and
relegated to the margin.
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François Quesnay presented the idea of natural order to his
contemporaries in his Tableau économique, first published in an
augmented volume of the Marquis de Mirabeau’s L’Ami des hommes in
1760. The Tableau was a graphic depiction of cash and commodity flows
between the three principle classes of society—the cultivators, the propertyowners, and the manufacturers. By means of a simple graph and its zig-zag
lines, Quesnay sought to visualize his main theses, namely that agricultural
production is the sole source of all societal wealth, that wealth can only be
produced by means of an autonomous system of exchange, and therefore
that the state must cease intervening with tariffs, restrictions on the flow of
trade, and other regulations. Quesnay’s Tableau économique received a lot
of attention because it attempted to graphically and systematically represent
an economic system—what Louis Dumont refers to as “an ordered
whole.”63 This is precisely what Marx found so brilliant in Quesnay.64 But
what was even more important and influential on future liberal thought was
not simply the notion of an economic system, it was rather the idea of
natural order. Systems can function well with external calibration and
intervention: an engine may function as a perfect whole so long as one adds
fuel. What was remarkable about Quesnay’s Tableau is that his system was
governed by natural order and was entirely autonomous of external inputs.
What Quesnay really contributed was not just the idea of a system, but that
of natural orderliness—an idea that would eventually receive its most
elaborate articulation in Le Mercier de la Rivière’s 1767 book, L’Ordre

naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques.

The birth or, perhaps to be fair, the emergence and maturation of
the idea of natural order helped shape a vision of the economic sphere as an
autonomous, self-adjusting, and self-regulated system that could achieve a
natural equilibrium spontaneously and produce increased wealth. No
doubt, material shifts in technology, in agricultural and industrial
production, and larger changes in demographics and international relations,
played important roles in the perceptual change. But what made the notion
of a “free market” comprehensible, coherent, and convincing was precisely
the idea of natural order. It is an idea that fundamentally altered the
discourse and the dominant way of reasoning and rationalizing the world. It
radically altered the way that contemporaries understood their social
surroundings and the relationship between public economy and “police.”
The same notion resurfaces in the work of Adam Smith and Jeremy
Bentham, and, today, in the work of contemporary neoliberal thinkers,
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such as Richard Posner or Richard Epstein. The idea of natural order has
metamorphosed today into the belief in the efficiency of the market. It is
natural order that makes possible Richard Posner’s belief that “When
transaction costs are low, the market is, virtually by definition, the most
efficient method of allocating resources.”65 In fact, natural efficiency is so
central to Richard Posner’s thought that he defines criminal behavior in
terms of efficiency: criminal behavior is human behavior that is inefficient.
As Posner explains, “I argue that what is forbidden is a class of inefficient
acts.”66 The very definition of crime turns on the notion of natural
efficiency. In the very same way, the Physiocrats would define criminality as
disorder and deviance from natural laws—as we will see shortly.
Today’s neoliberal thought traces back to this severing of “police”
and public economy. This discourse and way of reasoning has colonized our
perception both of the Parisian markets of the eighteenth century and of
our existing markets and exchanges. It is what allows many of us to believe,
despite the mounting evidence to the contrary—despite the bailouts of Bear
Stearns or Fannie Mae or A.I.G.—that our current market mechanisms are
in fact self-adjusting and self-regulating, and achieve stability with little
administration.
VI. Distorting the Penal Sphere

The next question is, then, at what price? At what price have so many of us
come to believe that the economy is the realm of natural order and that the
legitimate sphere of policing—of administration and government—lies
elsewhere? At the price, first, of significantly distorting and expanding
without limit the penal sphere, and, second, of naturalizing and hiding the
regulatory mechanisms in our contemporary markets, and thereby masking
the enormous wealth distributions that occur daily.
First, the distortion of the penal sphere. The birth of natural order
in the writings of the Physiocrats led seamlessly to the expansion of the
penal sphere as the only legitimate space for governmental administration
and intervention. The idea of orderliness matured into a political theory
that combined laissez faire in commercial matters with centralized,
authoritarian policing elsewhere—what the Physiocrats referred to as the
doctrine of “legal despotism.” Under the rubric “legal despotism,” François
Quesnay and Mercier de la Rivière formulated a political ideal of complete
governmental inactivity in all but the penal sphere. Given the existence of
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natural laws governing commerce, the économistes envisaged no role for the
legislature except to criminalize and punish severely those who deviate from
the natural order.
Natural order in the universe implied legal despotism in human
affairs. The Physiocrats embraced this doctrine in 1767 with the
publication that same year of both Quesnay’s essay, Despotisme de la
Chine, and Le Mercier’s book, L’Ordre essentiel et naturel. Their economic
writings led them, in a syllogistic manner, to the conclusion that natural
order in an autonomous economic sphere demands both that there be no
human intervention (in terms of positive law) in the economic realm and
that positive law limit itself to punishing deviance from the natural order, in
other words theft and violence. The logic proceeded as follows:
1. The economic, agricultural, and commercial realm is governed
by fundamental natural laws that best promote the interests of
mankind.
2. As a result, positive human-made laws could do no more than
merely instantiate the fundamental natural laws. At best,
positive law would simply mirror the natural order; any
deviation would produce disorder rather than order.
3. Therefore, positive law should not extend to the domain of
natural laws, or, as Quesnay stated, “Positive legislation should
therefore not reach the domain of physical laws.”67
4. For this reason there is no need for a separate legislature. All
law-making power should be centralized in a unified
executive—a legal despot—who learns and implements the laws
of nature.
5. It is only those men whose passions are out-of-adjustment with
natural order—those whose passions are “déréglées,”68 as
Quesnay wrote—who fail to see and appreciate the fundamental
laws of natural.
6. The only object of positive man-made laws, then, should be to
severely punish those whose passions are out-of-order, as a way
to protect society from these thieves and derelicts—“des voleurs
et des méchans,” as Quesnay would say.69
The notion of natural order does all the work in this logical
argument, and it leads inexorably to a penal sphere that is, on the one hand,
marginalized, but on the other hand unleashed and allowed to expand
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without any limitation. Since some men’s passions are out-of-order and
these men cannot appreciate the natural order, the legal despot has full and
unlimited discretion to repress and punish. Man-made, positive law serves
only one legitimate function: to punish those who violate the natural order.
Notice that the penal sphere, on this view, is portrayed as
exceptional. It is the only domain where natural order does not
autonomously produce the best result for mankind. It is the only place
where order does not reign. It is entirely other, in this sense. It is the space
outside the dominant realm of natural orderliness, the extremity where one
finds, in Quesnay’s words, the passions déréglées and the hommes pervers.70
The contrast with Beccaria and other cameralists could not be more
pronounced: their seamless web of public economy and “police” gives way
to a sharp distinction between a realm of economic order, where laissez faire
must govern, and a realm for positive laws and penal sanctions, where the
government must and may only legitimately intervene. The Physiocrats
invent natural order in the economic domain but in the process, establish
the penal sphere as the outer limit of the system, as the only legitimate
realm for administration and repression, as the zone of policing.
This new penal paradigm significantly influenced nineteenth
century liberal and modern neoliberal thought. Although Adam Smith and
Jeremy Bentham would reject Physiocratic thought—primarily because of
Quesnay’s devotion to agriculture as the sole means of creating national
wealth—both Smith and Bentham embraced and developed a notion of
natural order in their economic writings and reproduced—by the odd
conjunction of liberal economic theory and Beccarian punishment theory—
the same relationship between markets and punishment: natural order in
the economic sphere but government intervention in the penal sphere.
This vision of an ordered market delimited by the penal sanction
dominates the public imagination today. Many of us tend to view criminal
law as the exception to an otherwise less regulated, more orderly market,
where there—and there alone—the state must fully intervene to affect the
decision making of wrongdoers. This is reflected in the pervasive idea that
fraud and coercion are the major exception to mildly regulated markets. It
is this precisely combination—order in the market and government at the
border—that helped shape the modern neoliberal vision of penality.
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This vision is reflected, in the most formal, technical, and pristine
way in the writings of Richard Posner, eloquently formulated in the simple
statement reproduced earlier, to the effect that “The major function of
criminal law in a capitalist society is to prevent people from bypassing the . .
. “market,” explicit or implicit.”71 Here, the idea of market efficiency leads
to a penal theory akin to legal despotism: the only legitimate space where
government can intervene is in the penal sphere, in the space of market
bypassing. Elsewhere, it must leave alone voluntary, compensated
exchanges—as if the space of the market existed somehow independently of
the policing, as if the two domains were distinct. Richard Posner’s further
idea that crime can be defined in terms of actions that are not efficient
rehearses the Physiocratic idea that the homme pervers—the perverted
man—is the one who does not abide by the natural order of the universe.
Posner’s vision of the criminal law is a modern reiteration—in a new
vocabulary, to be sure, with more technical economic jargon—of the
writings of the Physiocrats. Neoliberal penality traces back to the legal
despotism of François Quesnay and Le Mercier de la Rivière.
The modern discourse of natural order—the new version of market
efficiency—facilitates the growth of the penal sphere by making it easier to
resist government intervention in the marketplace but to embrace
criminalizing any and all deviations from the market. It facilitates passing
new criminal statutes and wielding the penal sanction more liberally—

because that is where administration is necessary; that is where the state can
legitimately act; that is the proper sphere of policing. In other words, the

neoliberal vision not only goes hand-in-hand with a certain way of
perceiving markets and history—of believing, for instance, that the early
markets of the eighteenth century were regulated excessively and that ours
today are free—but it also eases the growth of the carceral sphere. By
marginalizing and pushing punishment to the outskirts of the market, the
neoliberal discourse fertilizes the penal domain.
As a form of discourse, as a logic and rationality, neoliberal penality
itself certainly does not cause more persons to be incarcerated. Naturally,
there are more immediate factors that produce the increased prison rates,
such as the War on Drugs, mandatory minimum sentencing, racial
profiling, and political swings toward law-and-order politics, to name but a
few. But as a form of discourse, neoliberal penality facilitates these more
immediate and proximate factors. It makes them more easy by reducing the
political resistance and friction. By making them seem more natural and
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right. By intimating that government intervention in the penal sphere is
proper and legitimate.
Modern penal outcomes in the West are entirely consistent with
this: The size and the cost of our neoliberal penal sphere in the West far
exceeds those of earlier periods.* In the United States, for instance, the
twentieth century experienced very high rates and costs of
institutionalization—in both prisons and asylums. Prison populations
skyrocketed beginning in 1970, rising from under 200,000 persons to more
than 1.3 million in 2002. That year, our prison rate surpassed for the first
time the 600 mark—600 inmates per 100,000 adults. Including inmates in
jail, the incarcerated population exceeded two million in 2001. In the
1930s, 40s and 50s, the United States also institutionalized people at high
rates, but in state and county mental hospitals, institutions for “mental
defectives and epileptics” and “the mentally retarded,” psychiatric wards in
VA hospitals, as well as “psychopathic,” city, and private mental hospitals.
When the data on these mental institutions are combined with the data on
prison rates for 1928 through 2000, the rates of overall institutionalization
in this country are staggering: in the period between 1935 and 1963, the
United States consistently institutionalized (in mental institutions and
prisons) at rates above 700 per 100,000 adults—with highs of 778 in 1939
and 786 in 1955.
A study by the PEW Center on States published in March 2008
reports that prison spending in the United States has outpaced all other
comparable spending budgets except Medicaid. “Criminal correction
spending is outpacing budget growth in education, transportation and
public assistance, based on state and federal data. Only Medicaid spending
grew faster than state corrections spending, which quadrupled in the past
two decades.”72 According to the PEW report, corrections spending cost the
states a staggering $47 billion in 2008, in large part because of the
extraordinarily high rates of incarceration – the fact is, “One in every 31
adults, or 7.3 million Americans, is in prison, on parole or probation, at a
cost to the states of $47 billion in 2008.”73

*

This project focuses on a shift over time from an earlier penal rationality to neoliberal
penality. As a result, it is important to compare modern neoliberal penal practices to
earlier periods in the same neoliberal countries, such as the United States, Britain, or
France.
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The last time these costs were studied, in 2001, the fifty states spent
a combined $38 billion on corrections alone, excluding prison building.74
California’s annual prison budget for 2007-08 was almost $10 billion
dollars in 2007, nearly twice as large as it was in 2001.75 For many states,
the annual budget allocates more funding for prisons than for four-year
college education.76
With about one percent of the adult population in the United
States behind bars, the size and cost of our penal sphere is undoubtedly
greater than it was in earlier periods. The costs and human capital
associated with the criminal sanction are, today, exceedingly large. And this
is consistent with the neoliberal penal vision: we are far more willing to
spend dollars and allow the state to intervene in the penal sphere than we
are in education or elsewhere, because that is where the government has a
legitimate role. The federal bailouts of 2008 represent an exception to this
logic; but they are exceptional and, in that sense, they prove the rule. Both
sides of the political spectrum view the bailouts as “outrageous,” though
necessary in a time of crisis to boost public confidence in the financial
markets and ensure the continuing flow of credit to American homeowners.
Most believe that the bailouts are temporary measures that will be followed
by a return to normal. Even the New York Times editorial page assumes,
for instance, that the nationalized Fannie and Freddie enterprises will
eventually be privatized again.
VII.

Masking Wealth Distributions

Second. The rhetoric of neoliberalism naturalizes the market and thereby
hides the massive distribution that takes place there. It masks the state’s
role, the state’s ties to non-state associations—associations such as the
Chicago Board of Trade—and the extensive legal and regulatory framework
that encases those associations. But is also hides the freedom that existed
before. In other words, it masks both the amount of freedom in the earlier
eighteenth century and the amount of regulation today.
On the one hand, there was far more “freedom” in the Parisian
markets of the eighteenth century than we tend to acknowledge today. The
fact is, the police matters in eighteenth century Paris were trivial. Violations
involved fines only, and mostly trifling fines at that. Accusations triggered
minimal process. The punishments were minor. As Duchesne explained in
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his discussion in Title I, § III, Des Sentences: “The intervention of
prosecutors is not necessary in police matters, everything there should be
treated summarily and judged immediately;” “fines and other punishments
imposed in police matters are not accompanied by disgrace;” and “the
punishments [meted out by the police] ordinarily should be moderate and
serve only to prevent the repetition of the offense.”77 The police jurisdiction
was essentially a civil, not a criminal, matter and for most of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was part of the civil chamber. At
various times, such as during the reforms of the Bureau de Police of 1572,
the police was simply reduced to street cleaning.78
The history of the founding of the police chamber reflects its
secondary status. Louis XIV, after taking power in his own hands, turned
first to finances, but then to justice and police matters. He created two
special sessions of his council, one for matters of justice and one for matters
of police. The first, the council on justice, he presided over himself on
numerous occasions. It produced in 1667 the codification of rules of civil
procedure, what was referred to as “ordonnance civile”, as well as, in 1670,
the codification of criminal procedure—“l’ordonnance criminelle.” The
second council on police, we know far less about, because it received so
much less attention and Louis XIV never presided over the sessions. It was
simply far less important. Louis XIV ultimately carved out the police
chamber from within the civil lieutenant’s job description and secondseated the lieutenant de police. “The lieutenant de police will seat ordinarily
at the Châtelet in the chamber dite Chambre civile, and will dispose of a
small office adjacent.”79 The police of the Châtelet was by no means a
criminal jurisdiction—there was a separate chamber for those more
important matters—levied only minor fines, if that, and took a second seat
to both the criminal chamber and the civil chamber.
A close examination of the archives from the police of the Châtelet
of Paris maintained at the National Archives of France, the famous Série Y,
reveals the trivial and sporadic nature of the policing. The leading recurring
violation that the police commissioners noted on their rounds was the
failure to sweep one’s storefront—the entry read “non balayé,” in other
words “not swept.” The papers, reports, and records of the police chamber
read like those of a small claims court and presented predominantly trivial
matters. For instance, the carton of papers for the first six months of 1758
contains month-by-month reports of the daily activity of the police
commissioners and lists all the violations — the contraventions — that the
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commissioners observed. Most of the contraventions are for failure to sweep
the side-walk. They read as follows: “Police des 8 et 9 février 1758: Le
devant de la porte du cabaret au merle blanc non balayé. Rue des francs
Bourgeois: Le devant du cabaret de tardif aux fontaines de bourgogne non
balayé.” And the list of “non balayé” goes on and on, interspersed with
violations for individuals found gaming or drinking in taverns past the
closing hour. Here is the report of Commissioner Dubuisson, returned at
the audience of the police chamber on July 21, 1758, archived in carton
Y9459/B which covered the last six months of 1758—a relatively typical
entry:
8 July 1758 – no violations
10 said month – no violations
11 said month – no violations
12 s.m. – 3 cases of failure to sweep the street
13 – nothing
14 – nothing
15 – nothing
17 – nothing
18 said month of July – 4 cases of failure to sweep
19 s.m. – 8 cases of failure to sweep
20 s.m. – nothing
Here is the report of the same commissioner, Dubuisson, submitted to the
police chamber the following week, July 28, 1758:
21 July – no violations
22 same month – vehicle without plates or a number blocking public

access; stones left in disarray by a master mason blocking the streams;
neglected mound of gravel; 2 cases of failure to sweep
24 – nothing
25 – nothing
26 – wood and stones blocking the public way; 4 cases of failure to sweep;
28 s.m. – 3 cases of neglected gravel; manure causing bad odors; garbage
thrown in our presence from the window of the second floor of the house
occupied by the baker near the rue de la tinerandrie; failure to sweep.

No need to belabor the point: the records reflect predominantly
trivial violations when they reflect any at all. The contrast with the records
of the criminal jurisdiction of the Châtelet of Paris is striking. A review of
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the carton for January and February 1760 discloses serious cases, with
lengthy informations, interrogatories, and long indictments with numerous
witnesses. The process and types of cases in the criminal files make the
police chamber look like child’s play.
The trivial nature of the commissioners’ beat reports reflects, in
part, the fact that these commissioners had a large number of other
functions, both civil and criminal, beyond merely enforcing these petty
violations of police ordinances. The commissioners—recall their full title,
“commissaires enquêteurs examinateurs”—functioned as notary publics and
registrars of police complaints (in cases ranging from rape and theft to
traffic accidents), they made inventories, sealed property, and took
testimony, they were responsible for maintaining the peace and
investigating serious crimes, including capital cases—and were available
twenty-four hours a day. The commissioners purchased their office from
the King at a hefty price (as much as 100,000 livres by the late eighteenth
century) and several of their other functions (in contrast to their duties
owed the lieutenant général) were remunerated on a commission basis—
and as a result happened to take a lot of their time. In 1759, for instance, a
commissioner was allowed to ask for three livres per hour, with a minimum
fee of nine livres, for taking down complaints and declarations; for eight
livres per one hundred lines (each thirteen syllables long) of an inventory;
and half a livre per page (each page twenty-two lines of twelve syllables) for
copying any and all documents. In other words, the commissioners were
busy with other tasks.
And they too, like many of us, were more drawn to high-profile
cases than to the more pedestrian tasks of policing fine-only ordinances. So
when one examines their papers at the Archives Nationales, it becomes clear
that they were far more interested in the procès-verbaux—the verbal
testimonials of witnesses—in capital cases and the more intriguing and
entertaining cases of pederasts (homosexuals) and femmes du monde
(prostitutes). When cases involving grain did come to their attention and
occupy their time, it generally involved significant cases of alleged theft, and
not simply trivial deviations from market regulations.
More to the point, a careful review of the sentences meted out by
the police chamber of the Châtelet reveals that the police des grains
constituted a minor function of the chamber’s jurisdiction. This is evident
from a quantitative study of a collection of 932 sentences and ordinances
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from the police chamber meted out over the period 1668 to 1787,
contained in two cartons at the National Archives. Of the 932 records, 580
are police sentences, and of those, only seventy-seven or 8.40 percent are
related in some way to the cultivation and commerce of grain, to the market
in grains, to bakers, millers, or other activities that have a bearing on bread,
flour, or grain; with another twenty-seven or 2.94 percent very tangentially
related or touching in any way whatsoever on grain or bread. Of the
seventy-seven relevant sentences, only sixty resulted in fines. Within the
category of the highest fines meted out—3,000 livres or more—grainrelated offenses represented a small fraction of the whole, only two (or 5.4
percent) of thirty-seven such fines. There was only one sentence of
imprisonment meted out in the entire period, and it was for a servant who
did not deliver goods—unrelated to the grain trade. It turns out, the police
des grains represented a small fraction of the business of the lieutenant de
police, all of which was essentially trivial. The archival records reveal a
disproportionate number of terribly minor infractions and a relatively small
place for the police des grains. The historians of the Parisian grain and
bread markets—predominantly liberal opponents of the regulations such as
Freminville and Afanassiev—did a skilled job of picking out the sentences
related to the police des grains from the haystack of police records. But we
should be weary that so much of our understanding of the police des grains
is filtered through the lens of these opponents who had a morbid
fascination with regimentation.
On the other hand, there is also far more “constraint” in our
contemporary markets than we typically tend to acknowledge today. The
truth is, every action of the broker, buyer, seller, investment bank,
brokerage firm, exchange member—even non-member—is scrutinized and
regulated. The rules, oversight committees, advisory letters, investigations,
as well as the legal actions, abound. The list of do’s and don’ts is extensive.
Brokerage firms may combine and use black-lists to restrict retail buyers
from reselling their public offering stock during a “retail restricted period”
of between 30 and 90 days following their purchase of newly offered stock,
but the same brokerage firms may allow large institutions to dump their
stock in the aftermarket at any time. Exchange members on the New York
Stock Exchange may get together and fix the commission rate on stock
transactions of less than $500,000—i.e. set the price of buying and selling
stock—but freely negotiate commissions in larger stock transactions. The
National Association of Securities Dealers may combine and agree to
restrict the sale and fix the resale price of securities of open-end
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management companies—“mutual funds”—in the secondary market
between dealers, between dealers and investors, and between investors,
thereby eliminating the secondary market in mutual funds—a market
which was significant prior to 1940; and competing corporate take-over
bidders may join together and make joint take-over offers to stockholders,
even if it means that together they reduce the offering price for the stock
purchase. The rules and regulations surrounding our modern markets are
intricate and often arcane, and they belie the simplistic idea that our
markets are “free.” The reality is far more complex.
Today, we want to see freedom even when there is nothing but
constraint in front of us. That desire, that urge to believe is precisely what
masks the distribution that accompanies the actual administration of
contemporary markets. Because we want to believe that the markets are
operating on their own, we let slide the actual cash flows and fail to
properly scrutinize how the administration of the markets actually
distributes wealth. Because we want to believe in self-adjusting markets, we
do not adequately investigate the consequences of our choices. There is a
paragraph in the standard commodities futures contract on the Chicago
Board of Trade that provides that all grain shall be delivered in the City of
Chicago. The City of Chicago has a finite capacity for warehousing grain,
and is at a good distance from the corn, wheat, and soybean fields of
Nebraska. That may increase the relative costs for the Nebraska farmer. The
mere existence of standardized commodities futures contracts—which were
first permitted in the twentieth century—tends to slightly reduce the mean
price of commodities. This too may work to the detriment of the producer.
These are some of the distributional consequences that go unexamined,
precisely because we do not want to see all the choices that organize the
market—because the market has been naturalized. The idea of natural order
and, today, of market efficiency obfuscates these distributions of wealth and
resources.
VIII.

Method

A word on method. I am by no means the first to toil in these fields and
this project owes much to the ground-breaking work of Joseph Schumpeter,
Robert Hale, Louis Dumont, Michel Foucault, and many others, who have
all contributed in important ways to our understanding of late modern
capitalism. The objective of this particular project may be different, but
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naturally builds on their insights. This study seeks to explore the mode of
rationality that made neoliberalism “natural” today—that naturalized our
conception of the penal sphere as the outer limit of the free market, as the
unique location where government intervention is automatically legitimate.
The goal is not to offer a historical explanation why this mode of rationality
developed, nor to propose a material explanation—whether economic or
political—as to how the idea of natural order emerged. It is instead to trace
how certain beliefs—for instance, the idea that the Parisian markets were
overregulated and that our modern exchanges are free—became believable.
How they became so obvious. And at what price.
In this sense, this project continues in the furrow of a lengthy
nominalist tradition—a strain of thought that runs through the work of
thinkers as far back as the Medieval Franciscan friar William of Occam, to
the sixteenth century Renaissance essays of Michel de Montaigne, to the
nineteenth century polemics of Friedrich Nietzsche. It starts by
conceptualizing “natural order” and “market efficiency” as what William of
Occam would have called “universals,” and then explores what work those
universals are accomplishing. It challenges the very existence of those
universal categories in order to discover, first, what the designation serves,
but second, what it hides regarding the unique aspects of individual entities
– in this case, individual forms of social and economic organization.
The answer that I develop in these pages reflects this nominalist
influence: we have developed and deployed these universals to make sense
of what are in fact irreducibly individual phenomena, to place discreet and
divergent practices into a coherent framework, to deploy simple heuristic
devices or stereotypes to expedite our evaluation and judgment. In so doing
so, we have created structures of meaning that do work for us—at a steep
price.
The historian, Paul Veyne, in his recent book Foucault: Sa pensée,
sa personne (2008), excavates a similar nominalist influence in the work of

Foucault, drawing particular attention to the opening passage of Foucault’s
1979 lectures, Naissance de la biopolitique.80 In that opening lecture,
Foucault steps back to explain and reframe his larger intellectual project and
to place his writings within a methodological framework. The method in all
his work, Foucault explains, had always been to start by doing away with
the central explanatory concept, as a way to reexamine the work that the
concept accomplished. Foucault lectured:
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I start from the decision, both theoretical and methodological,
which consists in saying: suppose that the universals do not exist,
and then I ask the question to history and historians: how can you
write the history if you do not admit a priori that something like
the state, society, the sovereign, subjects exist? It is the same
question that I posed when I asked: … suppose that madness does
81
not exist.
The use of the term “universals” is revealing and, as Paul Veyne
suggests, the passage links Foucault back to the tradition of nominalism. 82
Foucault’s method was to critically examine the very conceptions that we
construct in order to learn something about ourselves.83 Foucault’s
nominalism was fed, in part, by a large dose of skepticism—especially, of
skepticism of the constructs of others, of those many universals. It is in this
sense that Veyne correctly characterizes Foucault as a skeptic—although it is
important to keep nominalism and skepticism distinct and separate. In a
similar vein, this project asks: suppose that “natural order” or “market
efficiency” does not exist. What does that tell us about the way that we now
understand the world? What work do those concepts perform? These
questions too are nominalist and build on a centuries-old tradition of
thought.
Although this project shares a methodological sensibility with
Foucault, this project breaks in part from his analysis. The fact is, Foucault
reified the idea that the police des grains under the ancien régime was
regulated excessively and he also strongly intimated that the modern
economic sphere has been liberalized. Even though Foucault’s overarching
project was to show that both were forms of governance, Foucault
nevertheless created and deployed categories in a manner that is somewhat
antithetical to this project. In his 1978 lectures, Michel Foucault specifically
deployed the category of discipline in its purest, most pristine form, to
describe the grain trade. It served as the central illustration to demarcate the
three key elements of discipline: la police des grains were centripetal; it
focused on the smallest of minor details and sought to eradicate all disorder;
and it categorized into the permissible and the impermissible, prohibiting
the latter. Foucault reified the idea that the Parisian markets were
excessively regulated with his use of the expression, “la police disciplinaire
des grains”: “if we take again the example of the disciplinary police of grain
as it existed until the middle of the eighteenth century, as set out in
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hundreds of pages in Delamare’s Traité de la police, we see that the
disciplinary police of grain is in fact centripetal.”84
This project seeks precisely to demystify that claim. Similarly, with
regard to modern markets, Foucault also reified the difference with the
ancien régime. To describe modern market practices, Foucault abandoned
the paradigm of discipline and fashioned a new category: sécurité. My
project is different. The point is not to show that both the police des grains
and neoliberalism are both forms of governmentality – which is certainly
true – but rather that neither can be categorized in the ways they tend to be
perceived and that the categories themselves of overly-disciplined – of the
disciplinary police of grains – and of liberalized, that those categories
themselves are meaningless and obfuscate the real work that needs to be
done. This project is premised on the belief that we have no way of
knowing whether our contemporary practices are more or less liberal, more
or less freedom enhancing, more or less regulated. We have far more
administration today than meets the eye or that we tend to recognize.
Whether it amounts to more or less is impossible to quantify. But the fact
is, we characterize these contemporary practices as more liberal—which is
precisely the problem.
IX. A Prolegomenon

Under the entry “Grains” of the Encyclopédie volume published in 1757,
François Quesnay proposed that “It is quite sufficient that the government
simply not interfere with industry,” “suppress the prohibitions and
prejudicial constraints on internal commerce and reciprocal external trade,”
“abolish or diminish tolls and transport charges,” and “extinguish the
privileges levied on commerce by the provinces.”85 François Quesnay’s
vision of an economic system governed by an ordre naturel led to a political
theory of legal despotism that would radically unbundle the earlier
understanding of a overlapping relationship between public economy and
the penal sphere. By relegating the state to the margins of the market and
giving it free rein there and there alone, the idea of natural order facilitated
the unrestrained expansion of the penal sphere. It gave birth to neoliberal
penality.
The hitch is that the foundational categories of, on the one hand,
“natural order,” “market efficiency,” or “the free market,” and, on the other
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hand, “excessive regulation,” “governmental inefficiency,” or “discipline,”
are illusory and misleading categories that fail to capture the irreducibly
individual phenomena of different forms of market organization. In all
markets, the state is present. Naturally, it is present when it fixes the price
of a commodity such as wheat or bread. But it is also present when it
subsidizes the cultivation or production of wheat, when it grants a charter
to the Chicago Board of Trade, when it permits trading of an instrument
like a futures contract, when it protects the property interests of wheat
wholesalers, when it facilitates the river transport of wheat, when it
criminalizes the coordination of prices, when it allows the merger of grain
companies, when it polices the timing of trades, etc. In addition, whenever
the government is not itself regulating a market, it implicitly or explicitly
delegates that authority to another entity. All markets are highly regulated.
At the same time, in all markets, there is freedom. Even in a controlled
economy where the price is fixed, there are variations in the quality of the
goods sold and along other dimensions that create product differentiation.
These produce cues at certain stores and not at others. Even in a highly
criminalized economy where certain goods are outlawed, there are black
markets that emerge and develop into robust trading markets where those
illegal goods can be purchased and sold.
In the economic sphere, there is freedom and there is constraint.
What we see is a reflection on us, not of the market. It makes little sense to
describe one regime as free and another as regulated. All systems have
complicated regulatory mechanisms that make the market function and
dysfunction. What is most important is to remember that the categories we
use to organize, understand, discuss, categorize, and compare the different
organizing principles are just that—labels. They do not capture the true
individuality of the objects described. And they have the unfortunate effect
of obscuring rather than enlightening. They obscure by making one set of
objects seem natural and necessary, and the other naturally unnecessary.
The central problem is that we use these categories for purposes of
evaluation. We classify forms of market organization into free and regulated
in order to embrace or reject those forms of economic organization. Even
today, after the financial crisis of 2008, politicians continue to argue for
more “regulation” as if “regulation” was a solution. Those categories,
however, are simply not useful when evaluating different forms of economic
organization. They are not useful when we are trying to evaluate
distributional consequences. The idea that “government tends to be
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inefficient” is not helpful—no more so than the idea that “markets are
naturally efficient.” There are locations of remarkable government
efficiencies (high-speed rail in France; mass transport in Paris), just as there
are locations of remarkable waste in private enterprises (million dollar
bathrooms for Merrill Lynch; million dollar throw-aways in Halliburton
projects). Naturally, these are all debatable and there are arguments that
these are not efficient or inefficient.
But when it comes to evaluating how resources are distributed, these
categories do not help. And that is what we are trying to determine – how
resources are allocated and distributed and whether those distributions
correspond to our political values.
This article is a prolegomenon, a necessary first step in the direction
of properly assessing modern forms of social and economic organization.
Necessary, because of the deafening and dominant discourse of natural
order and market efficiency. The very idea that we would use the term
“free” to describe our current market system—a system which is regulated
through and through—is a testament to the work that needs to be done. It
may be fair to say that the idea of natural order has so deeply and
fundamentally warped our understanding of economic systems that it will
take a lot of work to reach the point where we can properly assess different
alternatives for the administration of markets and punishment, and
dismantle our neoliberal penality.
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